For investors, this provision allows them to directly initiate claims against another party state -thereby negating the difficulties faced in lobbying its home state to pursue these within the rubrics of traditional state-state dispute settlement procedures. States, on the other hand, have good reasons to avoid international investor-state arbitration in their investment treaties and contracts. These include the high costs to defend claims, 1 conflicting interpretations by tribunals, a rising number of arbitrations (including against small and least developed states 2 ), and ambiguous evidence on the expected benefits of investor-state arbitration to host countries. However, for diverse reasons, a state may choose to consent to investorstate arbitration. In such cases, further issues arise about the form of the state's consent.
This issue of Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics offers a preliminary insight into what it means for
developing country governments to commit to investor-state dispute settlement, and how this commitment entails linkages to their development policy space and regulatory decisions.
Setting the context
The context within which these issues can be discussed varies depending on a state's existing treaty obligations and whether potential consents to investor-state arbitration are contained in a contract, bilateral investment treaty (BIT), or free trade agreement (FTA) that combines trade and investment provisions. While contracts probably present the most pressing concerns for small developing countries, regional trade agreements (RTAs) are also an expanding and significant forum for investment liberalisation, with particular concern in this regard focused on the interaction Policy Linkages of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Gus Van Harten* between the investment and services chapters. Other important contextual considerations include the manner in which a state, negotiating these agreements, construes its interest as a capitalexporter, capital-importer, or both.
In the case of Commonwealth members, of the 38 countries for which data was available, 3 all but three (Botswana, Canada, and the United Kingdom) were capital-importers. 4 For the 35 capital-importing countries, the ratio of inward to outward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock was on average 79 to 1 (with a medium of 6 to 1). Most Commonwealth countries are thus capital-importers; in some cases, overwhelmingly so. 5 Where this means that a BIT or RTA, in its effects, is one-sided -in that the FDI flows are mostly one-way -this will heighten the potential costs and risks for the capital-importing Commonwealth country.
Committing to investor-state dispute settlement
For diverse reasons, a state may choose to avoid or consent to investor-state dispute settlement. In the latter case, a critical starting point for governments would be in the formulation of an overall national policy to guide its consideration on whether, and if so how, to consent to investor-state arbitration. In developing the policy, a critical issue at the outset is the appropriate arbitration forum and rules. Other considerations in this regard include an understanding of the nature of investment treaties and investor rights given the dual role of states as treaty parties and respondents; the interpretive balance of power created between treaty parties and tribunals charged with resolving investor-state disputes; and how treaty parties and investment tribunals are likely to interact strategically. Choices at this stage will have profound implications where a state is required to defend against claims or pay large awards. These choices thus shape the risks that a government will need to redirect limited funds to litigation or pull back from development policies in the face of a claim. All of these issues are crosscutting for investment contracts, BITs and FTAs.
Who holds ultimate power in an arbitration?
Besides the arbitrators themselves, who holds the power behind the scenes in investor-state arbitration is important. Unless this question is resolved by the contract or treaty itself, then the ultimate appointing authority in an arbitration will be dictated by the rules under which a state gives its consent to arbitration in the contract or treaty (see Appendix). Each of these arbitration institutions offers its own unique legal and political environment.
The fundamental question is who will have the final say over a government's decisions. By consenting to investor-state arbitration, a state subsumes its government within the most powerful system of international adjudicative discipline since the colonial era and since unequal treaties. The choice of appointing authority determines who has the ultimate power to appoint arbitrators, where an award may be reviewed, the level of secrecy in the process, and the state's degree of control over the arbitration rules.
Investor-state arbitration subjects a state to the authority of arbitrators and appointing authorities, but also to the extraterritorial authority of other countries. When an award is made against a country, powers to review the award -in order to determine whether the arbitrators interpreted the contract, treaty, or a state's own laws appropriately -are assigned to the courts of other countries. Just which court will have this power depends on complex choice-of-jurisdiction rules in the arbitration rules and on the terms of the New York Convention or ICSID Convention, whichever is applicable, as they deal with the recognition and enforcement of awards.
Fundamentally, investor-state arbitration establishes international and extraterritorial authority in ways that other treaties do not. It allows claims against sovereign states by individual investors, without requiring the investor to seek relief in domestic courts or tribunals. It also allows money damages to be awarded against the state and for those awards to be enforced against assets of the state held abroad.
What are the preferred arbitration rules and forums?
Because of this power of investor-state dispute settlement, any government -if it decides to consent to this review mechanism -should develop February 2011 | Page 2 3 Based on a comparison of UNCTAD World Investment Report data on inward FDI stock to outward FDI stock for 2004. Those states whose inward FDI stock exceeded their outward FDI stock were treated as capital-importers, and vice versa. 4 The 35 capital-importers for whom data was available were Australia, The Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Cyprus, Fiji Islands, The Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, and Vanuatu.a policy on its preferred appointing authority. In this respect, two broad assumptions will be made here. The first is that states should choose an appointing authority that is neutral and politically balanced, and that is accountable to states. The second is that states should choose an appointing authority that is reasonably insulated from the private industry or 'club' of international arbitrators. Based on these assumptions, here are a few recommendations:
(1) States should limit the choice of arbitration rules given to potential claimants. Doing so allows a state to focus on the right forum at the time that a contract or treaty is negotiated, to monitor usage of the rules, and to focus on appropriate reforms in that forum.
(2) Among the commonly-used rules (see Appendix), the ICSID Rules and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules are probably the best of a limited set of possibilities. These rules designate an appointing authority that is accountable to states and whose performance can be tracked based on public information. On the same criteria, the next-best choice is the UNCITRAL Rules, whereas the ICC and SCC Rules should be avoided. (4) Because of the ICC's close connections to investor interests and to the arbitration industry, and the inability to scrutinise the decisions of ICC arbitrators for possible patterns of unfairness or conflicts of interest, states may wish to consider withdrawing references to the ICC Rules from their contracts and treaties.
(5) States should consider developing alternative forums for investor-state adjudication, perhaps at the regional level.
(6) Governments should develop an in-house team that can provide trusted and independent legal advice to senior decision-makers on investment contracts, treaties, arbitration rules, and arbitrations.
What is the legal and political environment of different forums?
The fundamental question beneath these recommendations is: who should a state trust as an appointing authority? How neutral will that authority be, and who wields influence within it? the independence and impartiality of the arbitration process. 
The role of the arbitration 'club'
In scholarly research on international arbitration, those who work as commercial arbitrators have been described as a 'club' or 'industry' based in major arbitration centres like Paris, London, and Washington. The club, it is said, has 'gatekeepers' who recommend each other, or aspiring members, for appointments. Arbitrators may also earn significant income from legal practice in investment law, while deciding the law and the specific cases. This raises possible conflicts of interest and may undermine confidence in the independence of the arbitration process.
An important issue in the choice of appointing authority, then, is the degree to which an authority is insulated from the club. Among the staff of appointing authorities, there is often movement in and out of the arbitration industry. It is obviously of interest to law firms and prospective arbitrators to have contacts in the appointing authorities, but the movement in question may create impressions that the industry's interests are driving arbitrations or policy decisions. For a state, it will be important to evaluate industry connections when choosing arbitrators and legal advisers and when assessing advice that is provided.
Conclusions
The Most investment treaties allow investors to bring claims under several of these rules, whereas investment contracts often provide a choice of only one set of rules.
9 Confidentiality requirements in the UNCITRAL, ICC, and SCC Rules mean that confirmed data significantly under-estimates their role in investment arbitration. Further, data on contract arbitrations under the UNCITRAL, ICC, and SCC Rules is difficult to collect reliably. The data noted in this paper was collected from publicly-available information on known investment arbitrations up to 1 June 2010. 
Scope of ITRC Work
ITRC undertakes activities principally in three broad areas:
• It supports Commonwealth developing members in their negotiation of multilateral and regional trade agreements that promote development friendly outcomes, notably their economic growth through expanded trade.
• It conducts policy research and consultations increase understanding of the changing of the international trading environment and of policy options for successful adaptation.
• It contributes to the processes involving the multilateral and bilateral trade regimes that advance the more beneficial participation of Commonwealth developing country members, particularly small states and LDCs. 
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